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This preliminary provision indicate:-1 how the Comnnlll)_ t.v \~i 11 carr.v 
out, tmder the terms of the new Chapter VI, t.hP. tn.sks entrusted 
to it under Article 2 of the Treaty, particularly subparagraphs (d) and 
(g). These tasks will be performed by means of a common policy, the 
essential features of which are the principle of the unity of the market, 
external action on the part of the Community and specific solidarity 
measures. 
In addition a privileged instrument is provided in the form of the Supply 
Agency to help the Commission to implement this policy. 
Unlike the original Chapter VI, which made no distinction as to use, 
Article 52 expressly limits application of the new provisions to civil 
and non-explosive purposes. Supplies for explosive purposes, therefore, 
whether military o:r civil, so far as they are still legal (they are as a 
rule prohibited in agreements concluded b,y the Community and, in the case 
of non-nuclear-weapon Member States , b,y the Treaty on the 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)),will in future have to take place 
outside the Community framework, as is the current practice. This 
accords with the civil nature of the Community's task·, which is 
clear from the Preamble and Article 1 of the Treaty, and with current 
practice as it has become established under the original Chapter VI. 
Again b,y virtue of the Community's civiL nature, the same applies 
to non-explosive military uses which, although banned by the Community 
agreements, are not covered by the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons. 
The new system, on the other hand, applies to all nuclear materials 
earmarked for civil use, even if they have not been made the subject 
of a peaceful use commitment. It does not apply to materials which have 
not yet been allocated to the civil nuclear cycle, whether permanently 
or even temporarily (i.e., with the possibility of eventual return to the 
military cycle). Because of the NPT of 
course, the latter could only take place in the nuclear-weapon 
Member States According to Article 52 the new Chapter VI, 
like the original one, applies to all the nuclear materials covered b,y 
Article 197, and therefore includes depleted uranium (apart of course from 
that used for non-nuclear purposes) and irradiated fuel elements, but 
excludes waste. 
Article '52 concerns only the tasks of the Community 
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as such, irrespective of national policies which, particularly in some of 
the Member States, promote in a substantial proportion the supplies of 
users • It should be the Community's role amongst other things to 
complement, reinforce and coordinate these policies. In this context 
the Community's responsibilities, though modified in certain respects, 
still meet the requirements of Article 2 of the Treaty. Moreover, as 
regards the basic principles set forth in Article 52, such as the unity 
of the market, which involve control b,y a public authority, the 
Community holds the ascendancy over the Member Statec. 
Section I 
The unity of the market 
This paragraph defines the principle of unity of the market, which is 
reflected by an overall ban on restrictions of any sort which are likely 
to affect the transfer, use and storage of nuclear materials u.."lless 
authorized or adopted at Community level either under the terms of 
Article 53(2) or under those of the international agreements entered into 
by the Community. 
Unity of the market ensures, amongst other things, that there is no 
discrimination against any of the users in the Community, who would all 
be treated on the same footing as far as the use of materials is concerned. 
The principle of the unity of the market does, however, have a wider 
compass than that of non-discrimination, in so far as it is incompatible wiLh 
the bar·riert' in qUE'f1Li.on witlJ rC',r;arrl Lo unc'r~~ even it' they are non-dir:crimlnaior;v. 
The abovementioned overall ban applies equally well to measures adopted 
b,y the Member States as to the provisions of supply contracts. The 
restrictions in question are: 
(a) barriers to transfers within the Community (e.g. import or export 
licences, other measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions, contractual non-retransfer clauses); 
(b) barriers to imports from outside the Community (e.g. import licences, 
quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect); 
(c) conditions governing use and storage within the Community (e.g. prior 
consent for reprocessing, obligation to store in a speci£ic State, 
obligation to use materials exclusively in a given reactor). 
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It should be noted that the restrictions in (b) are prohibited because they 
pose a threat to t.rade within the Ccrlillluni ty, given the need to prevent the 
diversion via other Member States of goods coming from a. third State which 
are prohibited in one of the Member states. 
The conditions mentioned in (c) are prohibited even within a Member State so 
as to ensure an equitable supply to all categories of users in a Member State. 
It is obvious, however, that this ban cannot affect the industrial choice 
open to the Member States. Different situations may ad''(~ here. Por examnle, 
one I\lember State might decide to do without nuclear enercy entirely. il..nother 
M0mber S'tat e, while adopting a nuclear programme, might dispense with rertain 
lines of development -such as fast reactors. Tn both caset. this would be an 
industrial choice which would have nothine to do with 'mppl,y and :::;hould not 
therefore come under the new provisions of Chapter VI. 
P~sical protection measures on the other hand, would be unaffected by the 
prohibitions in this paragrapW?9would be justified on the basis of Article 195, 
which would continue to apply. It should be remembered that this Article 
allows limited internal rules to be adopted in connection with public policy 
and public health. 
It would therefore be open to a Member State to adopt ph,ysical protection 
measures which were applicable within that State and did not form a barrier 
to trade within the Community. 
There are some conditions relating to the transfer, use and storage of 
nuclear materials, however, which will be considered to be justified: 
internally, to ensure that public dUthorities exercise a control over nuclear 
materials in view of their special nature or to be able to meet any 
commercial or industrial requirements; 
externally, to be able to reply to the legitimate anxieties of outside 
suppliers. 
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It is, however, important that these conditions should only be permitted if 
they a.re compatible with the Community's tasks as provided for under Article 2 
and that in any case they should only be implemented in a Oommunit~ framework, 
so as to avoid any sporadic action on the part of Member States which might be dama-
ging to unity of the market. I'his Community frame•vork is provided by: 
the procedure laid down in this paragraph 1 ; 
an international agreement concluded by the Community. 
Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, which allows Member States to impose 
restrictions on trade notably on grounds of public policy, public security 
and protection of health and life, cannot apply since in the nuclear sector, 
qy its very nature, grounds of public policy, public security or protection 
of health a~d life can alw~s be put forward somehow or other without any 
other justification. 
There is a whole set of measures which could be governed by the Community 
rules provided in this paragraph and ·.~hich ought not to be limited, so 
that the Community will be able in the future to respond to any eventuality 
in the development of nuclear energy. 
These measures could, in fact, comprise: 
(a) restrictions on imports into the Community; 
(b) restrictions on transfers within the Community; 
\C) conditions governing use and storage of materials coming from within 
the Community; 
\d) conditions governing use and storage of materials coming from outside 
the Community. 
contracts (contracts cond uded within t.r.e Comrrnmity as to-Jell as contracts with 
O't;.tzide suppliers) or even the Mera~er S-tates to make provisi·:m for such 
restrictions or conditions, or impose the restrictions or conditions within 
the Community. 
!~ports are covered not by this paragraph but by Article 57. 
'lIt should be remembered -that :Lnte:rnally restrictions could also be 
introduced under Ar-ticle 80, ;. prcnris:i.un ~.;hj ch has been ;.nserted in 
C~.::;.pter VII ''hic:h will be w:a;;'fec·i~<;;d. b;r t~0 r·evison of Cw;"p-~er VI. 
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As regards conditions o-r· restrictionr~ acc:epted b;y LhP (:omm"Lmity in an 
international agreement, their acceptability stem::J directly from the 
conclusion of such an agreement without the necessity for a special 
implementing procedure: this explains the reference to international 
agreements in the first paragraph of Article 53. It should also be 
remembered that the provisions of these agreements, in so far as they are 
"self-executing", are binding not only on the Community and its Member 
States but also on persons and undertakings. 
Special conditions affecting both transfers within the Community and those 
coming from outside might be likely especially in the following areas: 
limitation of use to peaceful and non-explosive purposes; 
assurance of adequate physical protection measures; 
application of Euratom and I.AEA safeguards; 
in the event of re-transfer out of the Community, obligation to pass 
on peaceful use and I.AEA safeguards commitments agreed with the original 
supplier; 
special measures concerning re-transfer of materials out of the Community; 
special Community schemes for the use and transfer of plutonium and 
highly-enriched uranium. 
The above conditions are of two different types: 
clauses which are standard in contracts but which have no real legal 
consequence since the conditions in question, deriving from public law, 
would apply even in the absence of these clauses (peaceful use, safe-
guards ); inclusion of such clauses might, however, be justifiable on 
grounds of political expediency; 
conditions which have their own legal consequences (e.g. plutonium scheme, 
prior consent to re-transfer out of the Community). 
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To make it easier to implement the new supply system it might prove nece:::;sary for a 
Regulation under this paragraph to enter into force at the same time as the 
new system and for it to establish an initial set of special 
conditions, compatible with a regular and equitable supply to all users in 
the Community. 
Other conditions might then be laid down subsequently in accordance with 
the procedure described in this paragraph. 
It should be emphasized, incidentally, that the provision at the end of 
the existing Article 52 whereby conditions laid down by an 
outside supplier, even in an ordinary supply contract, are to be accepted 
in the absence of a Community agreement, has not been retained. On the 
one hand it did not seem advisable for the Community to discriminate 
against internal suppliers as compared with external suppliers, and on the 
other hand the acceptance from outside of disparate conditions, 
conditions which are not contempLated in an international agreement, 
might prejudice the establishment of a Community policy in the field. It 
is quite clear that there is still the possibility of such external 
conditions being stipulated, but just like the conditions set b,y the 
internal suppliers it is now subject to the Community procedure set forth 
in this paragraph. 
The reference to Chapter IX is explained by the fact that the 
regulation referred to in this par~~raph could not 
derogate from the basic prohibitions concerning restrictions on trade 
between the Member States (customs duties and quantitative restrictions) 
which are to be found in that Chapter. 
As lor the procedure for the adoption of the reeulation 1 the solution ~iven 
in this paragraph ( C:ommission Regulation which can be referred to the Gound 1) 
entrusts pm,yer to insue regulations to the Comrni suion m> the i.nati tution 
having the responsibility of ensuring respect of the 'l'reaty and bej !lg in a 
position to arbitrate quickly and impartially \'Jhen there are differences of 
opinion awl clashec of interest, while maintaining a certain degree of 
initiative for the Member States. 
• 
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However, in view of the delicate nature of the measurea in que~rLiœ1 and 
their possible political repercussions, there is provision for recourse to 
the Council within a fixed time limit, with the possibility that the 
Council might repeal the Commission's Regulation if such action is 
agreed by a qualified majority of Member States, ag&in within a fixed 
time limit; the Council might even amend the Regulation if it acts 
unanimously, in accordance wi th the general insti tutional system ( see 
Article 119). 
In pursuance of Article 232 of the EEC Treaty, the competition rules laid 
down in Articles 85 to 90 of the EEC Treaty apply to the nuclear industry, 
save a.s otherwise provided by the Euratom Treaty. 
Under the existing Chapt er VI, all operations falling wi thin the ecope of 
the Agency's monopoly are ~~empted from the EEC competition rules. 
The abolition of the monopoly brings about an extension of the scope of 
these rules: the purpose of Article 54 is simpl,y to stress this fact, 
while rei tera.ting the principle of the precedence of the l'ltratom 'l'reaty 
in the nuclear field. 
The rules laid down in Article 53 pursue a different aim from tha.t of the 
competition rules. The fact tha.t a clause of a contract ha.s not been 
contested under Article 53 therefore clearly does not prevent it from 
being examined in the light of the EEC competition rules as regards actions 
which are not covered by the principle of the unity of the market and which 
do not come within the meaning of Article 53 (e.g. under certain conditions 
pricing practices, speciali7.ation agreements or abu::~es of dominant position). 
It is also possible that the special system introdur.ed hy Article 5.3 !;akes 
precedence over the EEC competition rules, for example where a condition 
referred to in a Commission regulation adopted in pursuance of Arti~le ~~(2) 
is a·t variance wi th the rules on cornpeti ti on. 
1 
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There can be no doubt as to the applicability under the new system of the 
other provisions of the Chapter on competition in the EEC Treaty and 
especially of Articles 91 to 94 on aids, considering that these provisions, 
which are not incompatible with the monopoly, already apply under the 
original system. There is therefore no need for any express mention of 
this in the new Chapter VI. 
• 
• 
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Section II 
International relation:; 
'l'his provision establishes the principle of the competence of the Community to 
conclude international agreements concerning supplies, this term evidently 
embracing supplies of both materials and services. 
Under the original Chapt er VI the Gommunity' s competence in this matter is 
not conferred directly but deri ved from the prerogatives of the t'\gency in 
pursuance of the principle of paral1elism between externnl and internai p01vers 
enshrined in Article 101. The abolition of the monopoly brings with it the 
need to provide for specifie ru1es defining the competenee of the Communit,Y to 
conclude such agreements. In the absence of sueh provisions, the powers of 
the Gommunity to conc1ude international agreements would be less in the nuclear 
field than those in the area of commercial policy under the EEC Tre.aty. This 
would be unacceptable. This is a sector where: 
- on the one hand, third States -tend to impose on the recipients or thcir 
suppli.es conditions relating to the une of the materials in question, whir~Ï'l 
cou1d be contrary to the principle of the uni ty of the market; 
and on the other hand, the Community dimension c:an be uaeù Lo l>enefi t nll 
the 1F.ember States and Commw1ity operators in the negotial:;ions. 
These considerations are all the more Gignif'icant when one considera that the 
Gommunity depends on non-member countries for the supply of its nuclear industry. 
It should also be added that. the Community alone has a safeguards system v1hich 
can provide third States wi th the assurance that the materials will be subject 
to the same conditions during any retransfer within the Community and thus 
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avoid the conditions, hov1ever legitimate, resulting in an unar.r.eptablc 
fractionation o;· the market. 
On the other hand, since a Member State cannot enter into commitments on -oehal:· 
of third parties, bilateral agreements rondurled~~ember ::>ta-Les :c:llould normo,liJ 
provide for restrictions on transfers r:;o as to givt_' the t.hird ~state l.mppl,vin,r; 
the materials the same assurances even within Lhe Community. 'l'hi s l·muld 
obviously result in an unacceptable fragmentai;ion of the market. 
therefore important that the Community itself should conclude the ag-reements 
in question in order to ensure that they respect the principle of the unity of 
the market. 
In accordance with the general principles of the international relations of 
the Communities, this para,eraph does not exr.lude the conclusion of mixed-t;ype 
agreements f;OVerned by Article 102 of the T<:Uratom 'l'reaty, when the ;11lflJ>lies 
in quc~:Jti on are in a con L ext. o"l' broader eornmi tmen·~ ,; whi d1 mi,o;h ~~ equally r:o.1r~ r:rn 
the J.1ember 3tates (e.g. r.onvention on ph,y-Gical protection). 
This is a procedural nrovision with its origins in Article llj 1•.:J~C on the conclu-
sian of commercial agreements. In view of the tedmical complexity and 
political sensitivity of nuclear agreements, it would appear expedient for 
the Commission to take advantage of the opinions :md expertise of the 
representatives of the Member States ~-Jhen they are being negotiated. 
'Phis provision enshrines the administrative precedent£> w~1ich have permitted 
the conclusion of bilateral agreements in areas which in principle are the 
responsibilit,y of the Community when the latter cannot or does not wish to 
conclude an a,ereement. 
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This Article also ~overs the somewhat unlikel,y hypothesis where although a 
Community agreement with a specific non-member country might exist, this 
agreement is not adapted to the precine needs of the users in a Member State. 
'l'his is what the term "appropriate agreement" in the first sentence in 
Article 56 conveys. 
A Member State should, in such ni tuations, be able to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to ensure supplies to its users when, for political reasons, the 
Community .fails to do so (e.g. lack of interest for the Communit~,r a::> a 1~hole 
in concluding a particular agreement or amending an existingone in a suitable 
manner). 
Since Article 103 is obviousl;y applicable, these bila~eral a.,o;reements cannot 
be allowed to hinder the application of the 'rreat,y <.U1d in rarticular the 
principle of the unity of the market; this is why, in particular, any 
restriction on transfer to other l'llember ;)tates is illegal, subject to 
application of the specia1 Community procedure Laicl d01m in Artie le ') 3( 2). 
Since this is a derogation from a basic principle of' the new Chanter Vl, it is 
important that the option or replacing bilateral ap;reemetl-LB 1-vith a Comnnmity 
agreement as soon as posoible be retained. 
For it to be possi bJ e for the Gormmmi ty to assume the re] ev;-uyl; clauses of tbese 
agreementR if necessD.ry, in the bilateral i'l.R'reement this means that the thir-d 
must be 
State committed to accept clauoes at least as favourable in a possible 
agreement with the (jornmunity and a.lso that there haf:> to be a clause stipulating 
automatic substitution in such a case of the provisions of the Community 
agreement for those of the bilateral one whenever they have the same scope. 
rl'he Member State concerned must, for its part, undertake to ea,se the taRk o.:· 
the Community, particularl,y in cespect of adori'Lion by the Comnunity of such bila-
teral clauses, in accordance with article 192. 
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Provided that the above precautions are complied with, Article 56 
provides that the Commission shall authorize - this is a legal obligation 
the conclusion of a bilateral agreement. The principle of '!om;nission 
authorization of the conclusion by a Member State of an international 
agreement, incidentally, is not without precedent in the Treaty 
(of. Article 29(2)). 
------------~--
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The inspiration for this provision comes from Article )9 in the original 
Chapter VI which generally makes exports of materials out of the Community subject 
to resp~ct of the general interests of the latter, including ~xports 
carried out within the framework of service contracts (enrichment, reproces:,ing, 
etc.). 
There have, however, been some developments of this principle designed 
to benefit an efficient application of the system. 
These concern: 
(a) widening of the scope of the provision to cover all exports, since 
Article 59 of the original Chapter VI did not apply to the processing, 
conversion and shaping operations (e.g. conversion, fabrication) 
referred to in Article 75; incidentally, Article 59 was only 
applied in practice to the export of materials produced in the 
Community. 
In view of the importance of Community control of exports for 
supplies and of the possibility of adverse effects in any operation 
in this area, no provision has been made for exceptions to the 
rule of Article '.57 in ord.e::- to ensure that the system remains c0nsis!-enL. 
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(b) the option c:ivcn exprenrüy to the COJTL'llission to ma'':e its !_l,uthori:;,ati.on 
0ubject to conditions. :3uch conditions mi,o,-ht for exa.mple roncern t.:w 
nractical methods of anplying them, especiall~r ln the case o:t· rn..-t~eriaL: 
o/ non-Commw1i ty origin l.ra.nsferred for treatment in the Community as 
part of oontract s Droviding for the rendering of servir: es over a lonr; 
period. 
It is obvious that in implementing this Article the Commission will be 
guided b,y factors to do with the possible effects of 
exporta on the supply situation in the Community, both as regards the 
depletion of its resources (exportation of materials and services at times 
of shortage or risk of loss of materials outside the Communityl_and as 
regards external supplies (because of the effect certain exporta might 
have on the attitude of the Community's external suppliera and because of 
the need to ensure that obligations undertaken in international agreements 
are honoured) • 
Furthermore, since there is the possibility that under certain 
circumstances export might prove generally harmful to the Community's 
external relations, the Commission should if need be consider other 
criteria. However, control should not mea.n the aupropriation b;y the 
Community of material which is not its property, namely material from 
outside sources which is treated in the Community. 
J'he Commission should have at i ts disposai all the information necessary 
for verifying whether a given exnort is in con_formi ty wi th the interest~> or 
the Gommuni t ~r. 'J'o this end it. can therefore dema.nd ëÜl the information it 
needs in order to carry out its task 
It should also be remembered tha.t in the system of the original Cha:pter VI 
the Commission does not have exclusive powers in the mn.tter. Any lilemb8r 
State can set up its own au·thorization system. 
unchanged in the new Article 57. 
'l'his principle remains 
,. 
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Section III 
Solidarity Measures 
@'ii.£1~ j,Q_ 
This provision embodies the Community's wish to encourage, wherever possible, 
Community-level cooperation in the construction of industrial-scale installations 
for the processing of nuclear materials. 
The expression "processing" (and "processed" in Article 75(1))refers to the whole 
body of industrial operations in this field, including enrichment and reprocessing. 
Under the terms of this provision, all plans of this nature, emanating from personsor 
undertakings within the Community and involving Links with other potent~~ Community in-
vestors, should be communicated to the Commission. Ensuring where necessary the confi-
dentiality of such plans, the Commission could then inform those persons and undertak-
ings likely to have a legitimate interest in the matter. This would have the 
effect of restricting the information to those qualified to partir:ipate by vi:r<ue 
of their own activities. The Commission would thus facilitate the formation of 
such links, making· eurc thn.t Lher·0 Ha::~ no di;~crimination wil;h re~;necl; 
to specific categories of interested party. rrhe original investor would, of 
course, be free to give concrete form to any such links. ITo provision o:· 
this nature is made in the original Chapter VI, but this may be re.o,arc~ec~ ::v 1m 
extension of the Commission's prerogatives under the heading of Chapter rv. The 
provisions of that Chapter, particularly those l~ing down the obligation to 
communicate new investment projects to the Commission and the delivery by the 
latter of its views upon them will obviously not be affected by Article 58. 
It should be pointed out that under the terms of Article 63, the Commission m~y 
call for the assistance of the Agency in implementing this Article. 
This paragraph is basically a re-working of the provision of the first paragraph 
of Article 70 of the original Chapter VI Hhereby f;hc C:ommi:::si0n may give ~islc..tl''i::l-1 
support to prospecting projects. However, the new verHion extends this 
possibility to the territories of non-member countries, reflecting the fact that 
the Community is and will continue to be dependent upon third countries for a 
great deal of its uranium requirements and that it will consequently have to 
mainLain :>table and rccular acce~-;c; to externrtl minin!3' -i~e:::;ourcc~-:. 
t 
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'l'hé. extension of the option to intervene for the Gotnr.Ju.nit,y \-Jill noL affect the 
efforts airea.dy made under the hea.ding of the original i\rticle 10 with respect 
to pros~ting within the Community. 
I·~rthermore, the report to be drm~n up by the Commission ev-ery two years on the 
actions that have been tak.en and t.hose envisaeed .over the following four years 
will help to énsure ·tha.t tlùs provi:Jion is implemenlcd ua well ar: no:lni.ble, wi th 
the em:phasis on continui ty and consistency, partioularly at fiua.noial leval, 
within a multiànnual framework. 
This paragra.ph is a re-working of the third pa.ragraph ol' Article 70 of the original 
Chapter VI. Its aim is to permit the a.cquiring of kno\'dedge of the ourreni; and 
foreseea.ble sta.te of Community resouroes, and also to :facilitate implementation 
of the first pa.ragraph of Article 59. <h the other hand, the provision of the 
fourth parag.ra.ph of the original Article 10 is omitted from the Commission's 
:Proposai since this refers to the right of equal access which is no longer 
maintained in the new system. '.r'.ae Commis si on' s general po\ter t o make 
recommandations to the J.iember ~)tates also means that the seeond nn;ra..'!raph of the 
original Article 70 can be omitted (as can the original Artir.le 71). 
Ariicle 60 
-- ... ----
The second ~aph of' Chapter 72 of' the original Chapter VI provides f'or the 
constitution l:6r the COIIIDission .of central emergency stocks with Community-level 
"· ~tnaaeing . according to procedures defined by the Council. 
This provision is linked wi th the concept of monopoly which charaoterizes the 
present syst•. 
Wbilst leaving this possibility open, Article 60(1) of the new Chapter, also 
provides for the creation of' decentralized stocks by the Member states, 
prod:ucers or usera on the basie of a Community act imposing an obligation to 
this effect upon these parties. Such stocks could receive financial support 
from the Community. These obligations justify à legal act by the 
Council, acting by a qualif'ied majori ty, wi th regard not only to the financing 
proce4ures, but to the system as a whole. 
The foremost objective in setting up these stocks is that of' aohieving a position 
in which it would be possible to oope with any shortages. 
The level of these stocks would also be established at Community level within 
the meaning of Article 60(1); this level could be altered in relation to the 
market situation according to the same procedure. Accordingly, these stocks 
• 
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could also, at least in certain circumstances, be used to offset the 
effect of economic conditions involving overabundance. 
Article 60(2) provides for the establishment of procedures for using 
these stocks. Among other things, these procedures could include 
the right to draw on these stocks and a compulsory distribution system, 
without excluding, obviously, forms of assistance and voluntary 
cooperation between the interested parties, to which the Agency could 
lend its support. 
Lastly, Article 60 would facilitate the creation of a nucleus of regional 
cooperation which could become part of an analogous system of solidarity 
to be established at world level. (cr. the work of the Committee on 
Assurance of Supply (CAS) under the aegis of the IAEA.) 
Quite apart from the measures provided for in Article 60, it appears 
necessary to lay down other specific measures to be taken whenever market 
imbalance is such as to affect the Community's responsibilities under the 
terms of Article 2 of the Treaty. 
According to the circumstances the Council would be able to decide on, 
by a qualified majority: 
(a) suitable measures with regard to prices, be they maximum or minimum, 
with the purpose of guaranteeing regular supply; 
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(b) the geographical origin of supplies: this is a measure designed 
mainly to diversify the sources of supply in order to ensure 
them; 
(c) the establishment of import quotas for supplies from outside the 
Community: this is a preferential measure benefiting Community 
producers. 
This provision enables the Commission to direct users and producers, 
respectively, towards the sources of supply and outlets within the 
Community and to endeavour thereby to achieve a kind of Community 
preference. 
In cases where the measures described in Article 61 prove inadequate, 
the Council can adopt, by a unanimous vote, any other appropriate 
measure. Unanimity is justified in this case because, unlike 
Articles 60 and 61, the measures to be adopted by the Council have not 
been identified beforehand in the text of the Treaty itself. 
It should be noted that in addition customs duties on imported 
material can be established or amended under the provisions of 
Articles 94 EAEA and 28 EEG and that anti-dumping measures may be 
instituted under the provisions of Article 113 EEC. 
The procedure described in Article 61 and 62 is designed to implement 
gradual intervention measures when there is any imbalance between supply 
and demand, with the purpose of supplementing the mechanism established 
in Article 60. 
These provisions do not exist as such in the original Chapter VI. 
However, in the context of the commercial monopoly accorded to it, 
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the Agency would have been able to take similar steps as the need 
arose, implementing a number of provisions, particularly those of 
Articles 60 and 72 and of Article 65(2) of the original Chapter. 
The disappearance of the Agency's monopoly makes it necessary to 
provide for a means of forecasting and offsetting imbalances in the 
regularity of supply under the heading of Community solidarity, one 
of the basic elements of the common supply policy. 
Article 63 
-----
Whilst it establishes the principle that the Commission is responsible 
for ensuring that the solidarity measures are carried out, this 
measure provides for considerable recourse, depending on the types of 
measures involved, to the Agency as a specific instrument intended to 
assist the Commission in its efforts to implement common policy. 
r --
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Section IV 
The Supply !geney 
These provisions are concerned with the setting up of the Agency and 
with its operations, and are based largely on Articles 53 and 54 of 
the original Chapter VI. 
The following points may be made: 
(a) it is advisable to maintain the possibility of referring to the 
Commission the acts of the Agency {under the terme of 
Articles 146 and 148 the interested parties obviously have 
recourse against the corresponding Commission decisions), 
regardless of the abolition of the monopoly, given that the 
Agency has certain powers which may affect the legal situation 
of the persans or undertakings concerned (Articles 63 and 69); 
(b) similarly, despite the abolition of its monopoly, it is 
particularly necessary to preserve the legalpersonality and financial 
autonomy of the Agency because of the role that the Agency 
will be required to play in the case provided for in Article 69 
and, if appropriate, pursuant to Article 62 and because of 
its functions in the economie field (Articles 67 and 68), with 
regard to which recourse to a pt.:bl i c body separate from the Community 
would appear more appropriate; 
(c) the proviniono concerning the At~ency't; capitaJ and cormner·cial 
management have now become optional as a result of the change in 
the Agency's functions; 
(d) the purpose of the reference to the Advisory Committee in to 
establish at Treaty-level the existence of this body set up 
-vlithin the system of the original Chapter VI by means of the 
Agency's Statutes. 
The Commission iüll not fail to propose sui table amendments to the 
Agency Statutes currently in foroe in the light of the new provisions, 
at the appropriate time. 
This provision sununarizes all the Agency functions provided for in 
the new Ghapter VI. 
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Article 67 
This provision states in particular that the Agency shall inform, 
advise and assist operators. 
This activity will be conducted particularly at legal and administrative 
level (for example, the Agency will advise operators as to whether or 
not the clauses of contracts conform to Community law, or help them 
to obtain export licences in non-member states). 
The Agency mast also endeavour to_improve supplies by forestalling 
situations of imbalance between supply and demand within the Community, 
encouraging operators to participate in c9ncer.~ed actions. 
This will enable the Agency to direct users:.,a.nd producers, respectively, 
towards sources of supply and Community outlets, and to endeavour, by 
, .. 
this means, to achieve a kind of Community preference. 
~na.lly, this provision requires the Agency to inform the Commission 
a.nd to advise it with regard to the form _that solidarity measures 
should take, or as regards the recommend~tions referred to in 
Article 61(2). 
Article 68 
This Article basically desribes one of the Agency activities as carried 
ant until now on the basis of the regulations implementing 
Article 60 of the original Chapter VI with regard to the matching of 
supply and demand. The market surveys constitute a necessary source 
of information to enable the Agency to accomplish the tasks conferred 
upon it by this Section. 
Article 69 
Under the new supply arrangements the Agency is no longer called upon 
to act in the negotiation and conclusion of supply contracts. 
----------
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However, it will SLill have to act if requested to do so by a 
non-Community supplier, in the context of an international agreement 
concluded by the Community (e.g. the Agreement between Euratom and 
the United States). 
Furthern1ore, pursuant to the combined implementation of Articles 62 
and 63, the Agency might, in future, be called upon to conclude 
specific contracts. 
Although no specific provision to this effect is required in 
Chapter VI, since the implementing provisions pursu~~t to Article 71 
should take care of the matter, in acting as a public service the 
Agency is clearly at the disposal of all users. It could not therefore 
refuse an order or create any discrimination between users without legal 
or material obstacles. 
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Article 10 
The first paragraph of this Article repeats the first paragraph of 
Article 56 of the original Chapter VI: it is designed to ensure that 
the Agency is in a position to perform its tasks according to 
procedures established by a Commission regulation in accordance with 
Article 11. 
The second paragraph obliges Member States, persons and ur.dertakings 
communicate regularly to the Agency the information it requires to 
supplement the market surveys it carries out in accordance with 
Article 68. It should be pointed out that this paragraph also provides 
the Agency with access to certain data (of vital importance to it in 
carrying out its economic tasks) concerning the execution of supply 
contracts (particularly as regards quanti ties and prices pertaining 
to supplies actually received or delivered), which would not ensue 
from notification of the contracts under the heading of Article 72. 
In some cases, these contracts may merely amount to a legal framework in 
which supplies are provided according to specific conditions to be 
determined subsequently by the parties concerned. 
Article 71 
This provision makes it possible to adopt the specific procedures 
by which to implement all the provisions of Section IV, relatin~ 
to the operation of the 1\V,ency described in the new Chapter VI. 
If it is appropriate, the Commission will be able to give the 
Agency responsibility for deciding on certain specific implementing 
measures (e.g. the drafting of forms to be used for the communications 
referred to in Article 70). 
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Section V 
Special provisions 
Article 72(1) 
In pursuance of this provision all contracts relating to supply 
which conflict with the principle ofunity of the market, the international 
agreements concluded by the Community or the solidarity measures 
shall be automatically void by virtue of being incompatible with 
mandatory rules of law. Since this is a question of nullity ab initio, 
this provision operates independently of the verification procedure 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and ]. These contracts cannot, therefore, 
be relied upon before any national court. 
The term "contracts concerning supply" covers all supply 
contracts including, therefore, the supply of both material and 
services (this also applies to the whole of Article 72). 
Article 72(2) 
Given that the monopoly has been done away with and that new 
arrangements are being implemented, observance of the new requirements 
must be monitored effectively and in detail at Community level. 
Article 72(2) thus provides for communication ex post to the 
Agency of all supply contracts within 15 d~s of their having been 
concluded. 
This obligation applies to the contracting parties: above all Community persons 
and undertakings (and also the Member States should they conclude contracts 
themselves - though this is very unlikelyi it also applies 
however, to operators pertaining to non-member states. 
It should be pointed out that no provision has been made for a.ny 
exception on the grounds of the impact of certain contracts on 
Community supply, since infractions of the new arrangements (especially 
the principle of unity of the market) can be committed in respect of any 
commercial transaction and can have repercuaaions for subsequent 
transactions. 
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Contracts concluded by intermediaries are thus equally subject to this 
provision. 
This communication is required only for the purposes of the specific 
system instituted by the new Chapter VI (principle of unity of the market, 
international agreements concluded by the Community, solidarity measures) 
and not for any other purpose, such as the verification of the respect of 
the rules of competition. Accordingly the contracts communicated in 
accordance with this paragraph will not be transmitted to those responsible 
for monitoring competition except where the parties concerned make a 
request to this effect. In this case, however, competition control will 
be carried out in accordance with the procedures, time limits and follow-up 
applied for that purpose, without any overlap whatsoever with the checks 
referred to in Article 72. 
Any breach of the obligation to communicate the contracts will be subject 
to the penalties described in Article 74, regardless of whether or not 
the contract concerned conforms to Community rules. 
On the other hand, a contract conforming to the new provisions of 
Chapter VI, but not communicated, would not be void under the heading 
of Article 72(1). Unlike in the case of either Agency monopoly or 
communication ex ante, communication ex post does not actually 
interfere with the procedures for concluding a contract (which depend 
entirely upon the contracting parties) and does not therefore represent 
an element of public law, which is 
such procedures. 
a vital and integral part of 
The correct implementation of the new Chapter VI by the Member States as 
regards acts other than the conclusion of contracts (e.g. laws and 
regulations conflicting with Article 53) is covered by the general 
procedures described in Article 141 et seq. 
In addition to the carrying out of the monitoring procedure under Article 72(3), 
the communication of contracts is also designed to enable the Agency to have at 
its disposal the information on the market situation necessary for it to be 
able to carry out its tasks in the economics field, especially those devolving 
from Articles 67 and 68. 
Article 72(3) 
The procedure referred to in this provision is inspired by the procedure 
described in Article 103 concerning monitoring by the Commission of the 
international agreements concluded by the Member States. 
Under Article 72(3), should the Commission observe (on the basis of a report 
-l 
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from the Agency to whioh contracts are communicated in accordance w~th 
Article 72(2) and which examines the dossiers1) that a contract conflicts 
with the principle of unity of the market, with the Community's international 
agreements or with the solidarity measures, it will send its comments to 
the parties concerned within one month of receiving the contract. 
The contracting parties would have the chance to argue their 
case with the possibility of satisfying the Commission's objections. 
If, however, the objections were not satisfied., the parties would be 
under a legal obligation, sanctioned by Article 74, to amend the 
contract in accordance with the Commission' e comments and within the 
time-limit laid down by the latter. 
The decisions adopted by the Commission in implementation of this paragraph 
could be contested before the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 146, 
while the interim measures under the heading of either Article 157 (second 
sentence) or Article 158 would also be applicable. It should be remembered 
that the Commission's comments under the heading of this paragraph shall not 
concern comol i ance with competition rules. 
Article 72( 4) 
Under the terms of this provision a contract will be deemed de jure to be in 
conformity with the principle of unity of the.market, the international agreements 
concluded by the Community and the solidarity measures (without prejudice to 
its conformity with competition rules) if the CommiBsion makes no comments, if the 
Commiasion's objections have been satisfied or if the contract haa been 
amended at the request of the Commission; pu.rsUB..nt tn 
paragraph 3 a...""ld within the time-lind ts laid dmm in that paragraph .. 
This amounts to a. presumption juria ~t. d.e.J..~d intended to provide the 
the interested parties with legal-security with regard to the validity 
of their contr<:wts. Furthermore, this pr·ovision will prevent any conflict 
"betlieen the Commission (under the heading of pa.ragraph 3) and the 
national courts which would be required in fUture to assess whether a contract 
is void pursuant to paragraph 1. 
1Relations between the Commission and the Agency as regards implementation 
of Article 72 will be governed by a Commission directive pursuant to 
Article 64(1). 
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Tkis Article makes proviaio• for tae Commission to carr,r out appropriate 
verifications to estabL-ish whether or not the obligation to communicate contracts 
is beimg observed. Laid down in Article 72(2), this obligation is the 
kingpin of the systea of monitorin~ the conformity of supply contracts 
to tke new arran~eaents. 
This verification system is markedly different form the inspections 
laid dowa in Article 81 with re~ard to safeguards: 
(a) the objective is very much narrower (it amounts simply to checking 
taat contracts have actually been comaunicated); 
(b) this is not a question of routiae since the check can be made only 
on the ba8is of a specific Commission decision; such a decision assumes 
that there are serious grounds for believing that a breach of Article 72( 2) 
m~ have been committed. 
(c) the Commission official• respon•ible for Making the verification will not 
be required to fulfil the requirements of Articles 81 and 82 (e.g. the 
consultation procedure); 
(d) the emergency procedure involving application to the President of 
the Court of Justice, referred to in Article 81, has not been included: 
the Commiaeion decision orderiag such a check could obviously be contested 
before the Court pursuant to Article 141, Articles 1~7 and 158 beiRg 
equally applicable. 
It should be pointed out that paragraph 2 which establishes the powers of 
the Commission officials responsible for verification is inspired by 
provisions relating to competition control in the EEC Treaty because of 
the similarity between the two types of check. This similarity does not, 
however, mean that there should be any interaction between the two systems. 
They remain completely separate (cf. comments on Article 72(2)). 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 also echo the provisions governing verifications relating to 
competition rules. This verification procedure is intended to be ~pplied only 
to persons and undertakings. If, under exceptional circumstances, Member States 
were to conclude supply contracts directly, compliance with the obligation 
laid down in Article 72 (2) would be ensured in the context of the general 
procedures described in Article 141 et seg. 
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Article 74 
-----
To ensure that the new w.rstem is observed effective sanctions wbioh 
are appropriate to the seriousness of infringements in this field, 
which could jeopardize the achievemant of the common supply polioy, 
a.re requi.red. For this reason specifie penal ti es are provided for 
in Article 74 in the form of fines and penalty p~ents modelled on 
the repressive system laid down in the EEC Treaty to deal wi th 
infringeaents in relation to competition. 
!hia provision appliea in the ca.. of infriaee .. •t •ot onl7 of the 
rulea set out in the new Cll.apter VI (aad, where appropriate, of tàe law 
derived therefroa) but alao of the agreements concluded by the Co..unity 
pursuant to Article 55 • 
It could happen that the actions or behaviour of persona or undertakings may con 
flict with an international agreement without actually resulting in the conclu-
sion of a contract and without, therefore, being covered by the procedure 
described in Article 72. Sinoe the Coaaunit7 ehould al~ be in a positioa 
te ensure tàat its international co-.dtaenta are respected, it ia essential 
that thsre be specifie repressive procedures, Under tae original system 
auch procedures were wmeceasary beoause of tllle Agency'a monopoly. Following 
the exaaple of Article 83 w1 th res;ard. to aa.t'eguards ., this Article 
applies Qnly to infringements committed by persans and undertakings. Any 
auch intrings .. nta by leaber States would be dealt with in accordance with 
tàs noraal procedures purauant to Artiole 141. 
Any infriageaent of the competition rules (which would be oovered, in fact, by 
Article 85 et s~. of the iliC Trea.ty and not by Chapter VI) would clearly be 
penalized a.ccording to the specifie rules applicable in this field, and not 
in a.ccordance with Article 74• 
The second paragraph relates to the general trea.ty system (Articles 36 ECSC, 
112 EEC and 144 F;nratom), -under which the Court al ways ha.s unlimi ted 
juri!!ïdietion in ~~li:lp®ct. of Cë~~tilll'l.u.üty !!!<~mctio:ne, i.e. it may no·t ouly annul 
a particulPr aanct:i.on, but a..ho amand its eff0ct. Tite faot that a fresb. sanction 
is inetituted by Article 74 means that proviaion must be made for unlimited 
jnriadiotion of thG Court in this case too, thereby extending the ecope of 
Article 144. 
The procedure for impleme•ting Article 74 will be established by the Commission 
by mt>:'!l.IlS of a. regulation. 
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Article 75(1) 
from 
The purpose of this provision is to exclude/the Community's ownership 
material imported tomporarily into the Community in order to undergo 
an industrial process (e.g. enrichment, conversion); a similar principle 
appears in Article 75 to the original Chapter VI. It is worth restating: 
a property right ia not justified because this material is not iaported 
with a view to adding to the Community's supplies. The generic tera 
"processed" as used in Article 75 ("processing" ia article 58) covers 
all iaduatrial operations in this f~eld (conversion, enrichment, fabrication, 
reprocessing), whereas in Article 75 of the origiaal Chapter VI the expressions 
"processing, conversion or saapinc of ores" caa be taken to iaclude 
reprecesai:ng, but 11ot enrichaent. 
Thia proTiaion is based on that of the firat para«raph of Article 74 
of the original Chapter VI, whica has never created any special difficulty. 
On the other haad, the aecoad paragraph of this Article, which is linked 
with the concept of monopoly, has been omitted. 
!Die provision is iaspired by the first paragraph of Article 76, of the 
original Chapter VI. 
Should there be aay aajor chaa~a in the supply situation, this Article 
will make it possible to amend Chapter VI without the need for recourse 
to Article 204, even after termination of the review procedure followillg 
the experiaental period referred to in the second paragraph of Article 76 
of the present Chapter VI. 
~~ 
' i' ,, ( 
l: 
1'. 
!,. 
;::. 
,, 
li 
I' ' 
r 
r 
j: 
I 
., 
t 
I 
.. 
